"Ignoratia legis non excusat."

Ignoratia legis non excusat.  

These case digests are for the personal consumption of the blogger and review of other law students who may also find use for it.  

It is also the opinion of the blogger to (sometimes) state the issue first as this helps narrow down the facts of the digest to essentials.

May this blog be of help to you.


Thursday, August 11, 2011

ZULUETA VS. CA

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

 

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

 

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

 

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.


Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;


Held:

(1) No.  Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."  Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

 

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

 

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.  But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

 

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Petitioner:       Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

Respondent: Republic of the Philippines

Ponente:           J. Corona

Facts:

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.  Its relevant portions read:

(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex”;

(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.

(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance’) dreams.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.  On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.

Issue:

The issue raised in this petition is:

(1) Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Held:

(1) No.  It is not allowed.  A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.  No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.  A change of name is a privilege, not a right.  Statutes control petitions for change of name.  Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.  Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.  Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

The petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan

Ponente: J. Quisimbing

Facts:

The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005.  The following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:

(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.

(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH, which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.

(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate.  Such document testified respondent’s claim.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling had been filed.

Issue:

The issue raised in this petition is:

(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

(1) No.  The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent.  The court considered the unique circumstance in this case where nature had taken its course.


“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.”

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua

Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella

Ponente: J. Puno

 

Facts:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.  The following facts were presented:

(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;

(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company.  He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company.  He married her on June 27, 1998.  Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995.  Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company.  She met Howard Comia, a co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000.  Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy.  Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.

(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company.  She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated.  The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated.  Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.

(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days  as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital.  On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the gate.  She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct.  Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless.  She resigned because she was in dire need of money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution.

On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:

(a) The petitioners’ dismissal from employment was illegal:

(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The issues raised by this petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and

(2) Whether or not the respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.

Held:

(1) No.  The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136  of the Labor Code:


(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.)

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

Complainant: Rodolfo G. Navarro

Respondent: Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, MCTC

Ponente: J. Romero

 

Facts:

The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by the respondent with the following facts:

(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent solemnized wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife;

(b) On October 27, 1994, the respondent allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.  Such wedding was solemnized at the respondent’s residence in municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.

Respondent, in his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA):

(a) Seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Tagadan and Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years.

(b) Maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.  In the foregoing the other facts are present in relation to the first marriage solemnized by the respondent as stated herein:

(a) The affidavit was not issued by the judge of Basey, Samar.  It was, however, merely acknowledged before him;

(b) The affiants stated in their affidavit that they knew Tagadan who was left by his wife, Ida Penaranda and she has not returned nor been heard for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Issues:

The issues are:

(1) Whether or not the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Penaranda’s presumptive death and ample reason for the respondent to proceed with the marriage ceremony of Tagadan and Borga;

(2) Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.

Held:

(1) No.  The joint affidavit is not a sufficient proof of Penaranda’s presumptive death.  Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides as quoted, “…the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death or the absentee…”  Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.

(2) No.  The solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was not within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.  He was not clothed to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.  As such, there are only three instances, which the law provides, wherein a judge may solemnize a marriage as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code:

(2.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(2.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.


There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.  Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

(Re: Sumaylo and Del Rosario - Under the Family Code, even if the solemnizing officer is not authorized, the marriage would be valid if either or both parties believe in good faith in his authority to solemnize the marriage.)

Respondent was ordered a suspension for a period of six (6) months.

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

Plaintiff-Appellee: Joel Jimenez

Defendant: Remedios Canizares

Intervenor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines

Ponente: J. Padilla

 

Facts:

In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant with the following facts:

(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City;

(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendant’s genitals was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation;

(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the complaint.  She did not file an answer.

(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence of the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted, or fabricated;

(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.

(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply in relation to the order issued in the preceding number.

(g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show.  The Court deemed lack of interest on her part in the case.  The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

 

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered upon the ground that:

(a) The defendant’s impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;

(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and

(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical examination.  

On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues:

The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Held:

No.  The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,

The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

BESO VS. DAGUMAN

BESO VS. DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000

Complainant: Zenaida S. Beso

Respondent: Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan, Pagsanjan, Samar

Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago


Facts:

Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso.  In the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts:

(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar;

(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;

(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract.  The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered;

(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.

The respondent averred with the following rationale:

(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman.  He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy;

(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;

(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.

(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).

Issues:

The issues raised in this complaint are:

(1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and

(2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

 

Held:

(1) Yes.  The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”.  In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:

(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

In this case, non of the three instances is present. 

(2) Yes.  The judge committed negligence.  Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s duty.  The same article provides, “It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.  Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate.  The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.”.

The recommendation of the OCA stands.

MANUEL VS. PEOPLE

MANUEL VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

Petitioner: Eduardo P. Manuel

Respondent: People of the Philippines

Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

 

Facts:

November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City.  The following facts were presented:

(a) On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City.  It so appeared in the marriage contract that Manuel was “single”.

(b) Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having been legally dissolved before the second marriage.

(c) Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus Gana.

(d) On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.

(e) On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City.  Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit her and he proposed assuring her that he was single.

(f) Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.

(g) Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return.  He stopped giving financial support.

(h) Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married.

(i) Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his marriage was invalid.  He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.  Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from her for more than 20 years.

 

On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC, and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant, Tina Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.

 

Manuel appealed the decision to the CA.  He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony.  He posited that the RTC should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. 

 

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification to indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all other respect, as to the penalty of the accused.  It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.  Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. 

 

Issues:

The issues of the petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of P200,000 as moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in law.

 

Held:

(1) No.  The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.  The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, is created by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration.  However, Article 41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

(2) No.  The Court rules against the petitioner.  The petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.  The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine, and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of society.  Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.  Even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery as held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.