HIGH OR LAW

Shocking.  The study of law is not what I imagined it would be.  I have heard challenging stories from law students on how their professors castrated, and castigated them.  I have heard stories of law students crying, which I then thought to be "too" much.  Having heard all these, I knew that what I was putting myself into was not an easy matter.  Now, I am an irregular 2nd-3rd year law student, and I have witnessed the same.  And yes, they are a bit "too" much.  Apparently, there is a generally accepted practice among law professors to antagonize their students inside the class.  I tried reading blogs from law students both locally and internationally, and well, it seems that this is the trend and practice.  IT DOESN'T MAKE THE PRACTICE RIGHT.  And so goes my appreciation to the law professors who make learning a collaborative and an interesting one.

Having taken Education and having passed the LET (Licensure Examination for Teachers), I somehow understand the basic foundations of and concepts in education.  These concepts are nowhere near the classroom of a law class and this makes me wonder.  I will not claim to have observed classrooms in other law schools but I will claim to somehow know that in teaching, there are principles and methods that are effective and are not so effective.  I also know that these principles and methods apply to all levels of learners be it in the elementary, secondary, or tertiary, or even in further studies.  I will not attempt to discuss learning styles because while related to learning, it is a different topic requiring a more in-depth discussion.  However, if there is one foremost objective of an educational institution, it is to ensure student learning - nothing more, nothing less.

Here is one of the principles of learning from Horne and Pine (1990): Learning is an experience which occurs inside the learner and is activated by the learner.  the process of learning is primarily controlled by the learner and not by the teacher (group leader)… Learning is not only a function of what a teacher does to, or says to, or provides for a learner… Learning  flourishes in a situation in which teaching is seen as a facilitating process that assists people to explore and discover the personal meaning of events for them.

In law school, recitation is the most common practice in teaching.  Other professors call it the Socratic method (although I'm not sure if some professors really understand the underlying principles in Socratic method.  Some of them just threateningly ask questions.  Such is not Socratic.)  While learners control their learning, they should also be provided a situation where teaching is seen as a facilitating process.  This is where some of the professors lack a skill in - the skill in facilitating and assisting.  It is as if their expectations of their students should already be that of a lawyer's and anything that fall short of should be regarded as mediocrity.

To add, "no one directly teaches anyone anything of significance.  If teaching is defined as a process of directly communicating an experience of a fragment of knowledge, then it is clear that little learning process occurs as a result of this process and the learning that does take place is usually inconsequential… People forget most of the content "taught" to them and retain only the content which they use in their work or content which is relevant to them personally.  Then it must be wise to engage the learners in an activity that is connected to their life experiences.  It is unwise to impose teaching on our students.  No amount of imposition can cause student learning."  

Imposition of teaching on our students is counterproductive.  You can't teach anyone anything.  A teacher must know how to use the students' experiences as the basic foundation of their own learning.  While some professors engage students, other professors would regard teaching a one way process, that is students should think only the way professors think.

Learning is also a social activity.  Human beings are by nature and culture a small group species.  We have survived, despite our physical vulnerability, by working together as a group.  And it is through collaboration - not competition - that we learn best.  In fact, competitive learning environments (my mark is higher than your mark) encourage surface-level thinking, increase dislike for school and decrease both creativity and subject interest.  People learn best through interactions with others, and these interactions strengthen both communities and individuals. (changelearning.ca)

I enjoyed two of my subjects not because the course was easy but because our professor allowed the class to group and to solve a case together.  Not only did this promote friendship inside the class, it also diffused the tension of competitiveness among us.  It allowed us to exchange ideas no matter how silly the ideas were.  It forced us to actively question each other.  It helped us overcome that trickle of insecurity by making us work as one.

On the other hand, I cannot completely discount the fact that the training I got from my professors continuously makes me to be stronger and more competent in what I do.  I am sure that just like any other law student, there were a lot of times when they felt disappointed of themselves each time they walked out of their classroom; disappointed that the question probably was the topic they didn't read that day or simply because their nerves got to them before the question the professor asked did.  These experiences all in all would make one a stronger person but being a stronger person is not the only thing we need to pass the bar.  We need to maximize our learning with the guidance of those who stand in front of us.

I remember one professor telling my classmate while he was reciting nervously, "Are you sure you want to become a lawyer?  Why don't you know that?"  

I wanted to say to my professor, "Maybe he doesn't know that because he still wants TO BECOME a lawyer since he is NOT YET one."  

Another professor says, "We are preparing you for real-life.  In real-life, if you fail the bar, you fail the bar.  So if you fail my exam (patterned after bar questions), you fail the course."  

In my head it rang, "Seriously?  You're a lawyer and you don't know logic?  That is false analogy.  Baristers have finished 4 or 5 years of law studies and most of them fail after taking the bar.  Now, you expect us to be able to answer bar questions while we are only on our second year?"  I bit my lip and I murmured, "That's not realistic."

Shocking.  But I'm getting used to it.  Although, I do not understand yet how law education has evolved into such a competitive, and adversarial system.  Maybe some law professors should take a step down from their pedestals and start reaching out to their students more.  Or maybe they should also be required to take at least 18 units of education before being allowed to teach; being a good lawyer is not tantamount to being a good teacher.  Or maybe it's high time law professors realize the importance of applying learning principles in their classroom instructions.  After all, law students are not excused from benefiting from these learning principles; neither are our professors.

ZULUETA VS. CA

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

 

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

 

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

 

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No.  Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."  Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

 

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

 

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.  But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

 

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Petitioner:       Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

Respondent: Republic of the Philippines

Ponente:           J. Corona

Facts:

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.  Its relevant portions read:

(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex”;

(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.

(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance’) dreams.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.  On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.

Issue:

The issue raised in this petition is:

(1) Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Held:

(1) No.  It is not allowed.  A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.  No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.  A change of name is a privilege, not a right.  Statutes control petitions for change of name.  Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.  Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.  Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

The petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan

Ponente: J. Quisimbing

Facts:

The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005.  The following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:

(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.

(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH, which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.

(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate.  Such document testified respondent’s claim.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling had been filed.

Issue:

The issue raised in this petition is:

(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

(1) No.  The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent.  The court considered the unique circumstance in this case where nature had taken its course.

“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.”

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua

Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella

Ponente: J. Puno

 

Facts:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.  The following facts were presented:

(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;

(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company.  He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company.  He married her on June 27, 1998.  Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995.  Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company.  She met Howard Comia, a co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000.  Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy.  Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.

(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company.  She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated.  The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated.  Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.

(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days  as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital.  On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the gate.  She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct.  Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless.  She resigned because she was in dire need of money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution.

On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:

(a) The petitioners’ dismissal from employment was illegal:

(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The issues raised by this petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and

(2) Whether or not the respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.

Held:

(1) No.  The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136  of the Labor Code:

(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.)

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

Complainant: Rodolfo G. Navarro

Respondent: Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, MCTC

Ponente: J. Romero

 

Facts:

The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by the respondent with the following facts:

(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent solemnized wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife;

(b) On October 27, 1994, the respondent allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.  Such wedding was solemnized at the respondent’s residence in municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.

Respondent, in his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA):

(a) Seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Tagadan and Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years.

(b) Maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.  In the foregoing the other facts are present in relation to the first marriage solemnized by the respondent as stated herein:

(a) The affidavit was not issued by the judge of Basey, Samar.  It was, however, merely acknowledged before him;

(b) The affiants stated in their affidavit that they knew Tagadan who was left by his wife, Ida Penaranda and she has not returned nor been heard for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Issues:

The issues are:

(1) Whether or not the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Penaranda’s presumptive death and ample reason for the respondent to proceed with the marriage ceremony of Tagadan and Borga;

(2) Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.

Held:

(1) No.  The joint affidavit is not a sufficient proof of Penaranda’s presumptive death.  Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides as quoted, “…the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death or the absentee…”  Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.

(2) No.  The solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was not within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.  He was not clothed to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.  As such, there are only three instances, which the law provides, wherein a judge may solemnize a marriage as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code:

(2.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(2.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.  Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

(Re: Sumaylo and Del Rosario - Under the Family Code, even if the solemnizing officer is not authorized, the marriage would be valid if either or both parties believe in good faith in his authority to solemnize the marriage.)

Respondent was ordered a suspension for a period of six (6) months.

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

Plaintiff-Appellee: Joel Jimenez

Defendant: Remedios Canizares

Intervenor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines

Ponente: J. Padilla

 

Facts:

In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant with the following facts:

(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City;

(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendant’s genitals was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation;

(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the complaint.  She did not file an answer.

(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence of the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted, or fabricated;

(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.

(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply in relation to the order issued in the preceding number.

(g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show.  The Court deemed lack of interest on her part in the case.  The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

 

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered upon the ground that:

(a) The defendant’s impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;

(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and

(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical examination.  

On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues:

The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Held:

No.  The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,

The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the decision, without pronouncement as to costs.